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I. IN SEARCH OF LAW’S GLOBAL LANGUAGES
Today’s discourses about the nature, scope and regulatory reach of transna-
tional law have far advanced from the time that Philip Jessup used the term in his 
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Storrs Lectures at Yale Law School in 1956.1 Written at a time when the Cold War 
was fast unfolding and the signs were hardly pointing towards any kind of united, 
globe-spanning legal order, Jessup’s observations regarding the gaps left between 
public and private international law, at the time, did not seem to cause too much of 
a stir really, neither among international nor among private or commercial lawyers.2
While the former were not particularly intrigued, private lawyers, especially those 
engaged in international commercial arbitration, seemed to have understood Jessup 
to state something rather quite obvious: by looking at the work of some of the great 
scholars in international and transnational commercial arbitration3 we can find a com-
mon theme that has been running through these scholars’ and practitioners’ work 
for a long time. Connecting many of these scholars and practitioners, both in the 
past and today,4 is the belief, that the ever-denser worldwide web of market relations 
has been generating its own rules of the game.5 Pointing to the actual use of the 
rules in transnational commerce, such rules within this law merchant would be eval-
uated with regard to their practical functionality rather than on the basis of a juris-
prudential test regarding their legal nature.6
Today, transnational legal ordering has moved far beyond the confines of 
commercial norm-creation. As a consequence, our conceptual as well as empirical 
1.  PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956), 2. 
2.  Inis L. Claude, Jr., Book Review, 51 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1117, 1118 (1957) (arguing that 
Jessup offers more by way of stimulating questions than by satisfying answers); C.G. Fenwick, Transna-
tional Law, 51 AM. J. INT’L L. 440, 444-45 (1957) (book review) (characterizing the question whether or 
not one should abandon the term international in favor of “transnational” as a practical rather than as 
a legal one); James N. Hyde, Transnational Law, 66 YALE L. J. 808, 813–16 (1957) (book review) (wel-
coming Jessup’s ‘surprising’ questions to be giving rise to controversial debates); David Lehman, Trans-
national Law, 18 LA. L. REV. 219, 220 (1957) (book review) (describing Jessup as “Mr. Iconoclast”, 
suffering from an illness typical amongst international lawyers, namely the over-conceptualization of 
International Relations); Eric Stein, Transnational Law, 56 MICH. L. REV. 1039, 1039 (1958) 
(characterizing Transnational Law as Jessup’s most challenging volume and describing his concept as an 
“assault” on the traditional barriers and classifications separating legal systems). 
3.  See, e.g., Berthold Goldman, Frontières du droit et “lex mercatoria”, ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE 
DE DROIT 177 (1964); Emmanuel Gaillard, Thirty Years of Lex Mercatoria: Towards the Selective Application 
of Transnational Rules, 10 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INV. L. J. 208 (1995) (discussing Berthold Goldman’s 
work and his contemporaries); see also the landmark study by FILIP DE LY, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
LAW AND LEX MERCATORIA (1992). 
4.  See De Ly and Gaillard, supra note 3; Gralf-Peter Calliess, Law, Transnational, 6 OSGOOD 
HALL L. SCH. COMP. RES. IN L. & POL. ECON. (Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 35/2010, 2010), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1630348. 
5.  For an elaboration of a theory of largely privately generated rules and principles of transna-
tional commercial arbitration see EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LEGAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION (2010), building, inter alia, on the pioneering work by Berthold Goldman, supra note 3, 
and Clive Schmitthoff, International Business Law: A New Law Merchant, in CLIVE M. SCHMITTHOFF’S
SELECT ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 20 (Chia-Jui Cheng ed., 1988). 
6.  See Calliess, supra note 4; Goldman, supra note 3; Klaus-Peter Berger, The New Law Merchant 
and the Global Market Place – A 21st Century View of Transnational Commercial Law, in THE PRACTICE OF 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1, 21 (Klaus Peter Berger ed., 2001) (“Today, the question is not whether ‘com-
mon sense and reason are rules of law’. The lawmaking force of the community of merchants grows 
out of their awareness for reasonable approaches and common sense solutions to the ever changing 
patterns and challenges of the transnational economy outside the ambit of domestic laws.”). 
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interest in the phenomena of transnational law and transnational regulatory govern-
ance has considerably expanded.7 However, a largely private-law oriented under-
standing of transnational law remains important for our renewed assessment of 
where the field is headed. Given the phenomenal expansion of transnational regu-
latory regimes and the attending challenges in socio-legal and normative terms, 
transnational law offers itself as much more than a mere label or short-hand for 
legal principles, instruments, codifications and border-crossing soft law. Instead, 
transnational law as a particular framing approach invites a host of questions with 
regard to its “true” nature8, its regulatory applications,9 and its politics, as well as its 
dimensions of institutional agency and legitimacy.10 This observation is of relevance 
for today’s investigations into different forms, manifestations, manifestos, or phe-
nomena of transnational law, because it prompts an investigation of the normative 
stakes that arise with any attempt to rethink law’s relationship to particular constit-
uencies. At the same time, it is important to remember that this effort of placing a 
legal norm in context is not unique to the present debates around transnational law. 
The invocation of a legal principle, the interpretation of a law or the demarcation 
of a right always and unavoidably involved the contextualization of the principle, 
law or right. Each time one legal interpretation is given priority over another, the 
norm itself is placed and situated in a particular way in relation to its environment. 
One such way of localizing a principle, a law or a right can occur by framing it as 
belonging either into the universe of private or of public law. Another localization 
can occur with regard to domestic or international law. The use of both these forms 
of contextualization plays a central role in the current debates around the nature 
and regulatory function of transnational law, but – even more importantly – around 
transnational law’s legitimacy. It is with regard to the legitimacy of transnational 
7.  By any stretch, lawyers are not alone in this regard. See, e.g., the impressive collection of case 
studies from the point of view of political science in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE (David Held & 
Thomas Hale eds., 2011); Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEG. STUD. 447 (2007); see also SASKIA SASSEN, STATE-AUTHORITY-RIGHTS (2006); Sally Engle Merry, 
New Legal Realism and the Ethnography of Transnational Law, 31 L. & SOC. INQ. 975, 977 (2006) (“Human 
rights lawyers and activists worry about a lack of sanctions and the obstacles to implementing a trans-
national law within the framework of state sovereignty.”). 
8.  See, e.g., Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J. GLOB. LEG.
STUD. 447 (2007). 
9.  With regard to commercial, constitutional and international law, see Peer Zumbansen, Trans-
national Law, Evolving, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 898, 913 (Jan Smits ed., 2nd 
ed. 2012). 
10.  Claire Cutler, Legal Pluralism as the “Common Sense” of Global Capitalism, 3 ONATI SOCIO-
LEGAL SERIES 719, 724 (2013); see, from an International Relations perspective, the observation by 
HEVINA S. DASHWOOD, THE RISE OF GLOBAL CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY. MINING AND 
THE SPREAD OF GLOBAL NORMS (2012), 6 stating, “The point is not so much that there has been away 
in authority away from the state to the private sector, or that the state is in retreat (Strange 1996), but 
that the private sector has created a new transnational space (Ruggie 2004: 503). [. . .] The state still has 
a role to play, as this new global public domain is conceived as an ‘increasingly institutionalized trans-
national arena of discourse, contestation, and action concerning the production of global public goods, 
involving private as well as public actors’ (ibid: 504).” 
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regulatory regimes that their alignment and localization in either public or private 
law seems to play a crucial role. 
For lawyers in continental Europe, the belief that there is in fact a real dividing 
line between public and private law is central to the way legal systems are operating 
and law is being taught in universities throughout.11 Attempts to question this line 
were made, for example, by German interest jurisprudence as well as American legal 
realist scholars in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as part of a more 
comprehensive critique of the underlying ideas of legitimacy and of the politics as-
sociated with either public or private law. This can be illustrated, briefly, through 
Morris Cohen’s work in the 1920s and 1930s, which highlighted the intricate con-
nection between property and sovereignty on the one hand,12 and the socio-political 
roots of contract, on the other.13 According to Cohen, property and sovereignty, 
notions which according to him are regularly associated with the respective and dis-
tinct realms of private and public organization14, are in fact intimately connected by 
the state’s endorsement and application of property rights, which result in no less 
than “confer[ring] sovereign power on our captains of industry and even more so 
on our captains of finance.”15 In other words, property rights, as created, recognized 
and mediated through law, illustrate their political nature, which in turn subjects 
them and their interpretation to political critique.16 As regards contract, Cohen 
found that “[c]ontractualism in the law, that is, the view that in an ideally desirable 
system of law all obligation would arise out of the will of the individual contracting 
freely, rests not only on the will theory of contract but also on the political doctrine 
that all restraint is evil and the government is best which governs least.”17 Against 
this view, Cohen famously posited that “mere freedom as absence of restraint, with-
out positive power to achieve what we deem good, is empty and of no real value. 
The freedom to make a million dollars is not worth a cent to one who is out of 
work. Nor is the freedom to starve, or to work for wages less than the minimum of 
subsistence, one that any rational being can prize – whatever learned courts may say 
to the contrary.”18
11.  Jan Smits, European Legal Education, or: How to Prepare Students for Global Citizenship? 13 (Maas-
tricht European Private Law Inst., Working Paper No. 2011/02, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1719118. 
12.  See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8 (1927). 
13.  See Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933). 
14.  Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, supra note 12, at 8 (“Property and sovereignty, as every stu-
dent knows, belong to entirely different branches of the law. Sovereignty is a concept political or public 
law and property belongs to civil or private law.”). 
15.  Id. at 29. 
16.  See, in this vein, also the critique by Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly 
Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 471–73 (1923) (highlighting the role played by the state in fur-
nishing a property right with distinctly different practical and economic effects, depending on whether 
the right-holder is rich or poor). 
17.  Cohen, Basis of Contract, supra note 13, at 558. 
18.  Id. at 560. 
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Cohen’s calling into question of a neat divide between allegedly private-non-
political and public-political dimensions of norms offers valuable insights for our 
navigation of present-day conceptual debates around the nature of transnational law 
and “transnational legal ordering.” The prominence of private as well as public-
private, so-called “hybrid” transnational regulatory regimes today19 prompts our 
critical awareness of potentially one-sided presentations of alleged efficiency and 
practicality gains offered by private regulatory regimes in comparison to state-based, 
public government ones.20 As the level of complexity in the organization of trans-
national governance regimes continues to increase, however, the importance of crit-
ical scrutiny with view to these regimes’ accountability and legitimacy foundations 
grows as well, especially as the evidence regarding the effectiveness of transnational 
regulatory structures remains contested. As such, our current interest in transna-
tional law must not be agnostic to these different camps of contestation. 
The question then arises, where and, possibly, to which scholars we should 
turn in developing a conceptual framework. Whereas Jessup’s 1956 book main-
tained an interesting balance between reflecting on the institutional changes that 
prompt our imagination beyond international law and international relations, on the 
one hand, and never fully articulated musings regarding the normative consequences 
of these changes,21 on the other, the current discourse is considerably more charged 
and complex. The tension between an ever more complex socio-legal map of the 
institutional dimensions of transnational legal orders and the normative questions 
arising from them is even more accentuated than it was during the time Jessup wrote 
his book, as the interdisciplinary challenges arising from transnational law today 
relate to the complex institutional and procedural developments, which attract the 
attention of legal scholars, political scientists and international relations scholars, as 
well as sociologists, historians, anthropologists and even geographers. Meanwhile, 
transnational law’s normative implications are debated among political theorists and 
political philosophers, democracy theorists and global justice and global ethics 
scholars.22 This constellation illustrates the degree to which transnational law not 
19.  See generally TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE
PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 60–126 (2011); see also LAW AND 
LEGALIZATION IN TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS 33–81, 101–21 (Christian Brütsch & Dirk Lehmkuhl 
eds., 2007). 
20.  Talia Fisher, Nomos Without Narrative, 9 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 473, 479 (2008) (stating, 
“The normative claim at the foundation of the privatization of law model is that, assuming conditions 
of perfect competition in the markets for legislation and adjudication, placing the power and means to 
create and supply the legal services . . . in private hands would lead to an efficient, high quality legal 
order, through voluntary interactions, amongst rational maximizers of their utilities.”); see also the crit-
ical discussion in that regard by Colin Scott, Fabrizio Cafaggi & Linda Senden, THE CHALLENGE OF 
TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE REGULATION: CONCEPTUAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES 1-188 
(Colin Scott et al. eds., 2011). This critique is shared by GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY 
ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (Vaughan Lowe ed., 2008) (presenting a comprehensive attack on the 
public accountability lack in the currently existing investment arbitration system). 
21.  JESSUP, supra note 1. 
22.  See generally PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE
FAILING AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2011) (proposing an approach towards the alleviation 
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only invites, but in fact urges us to connect current discussions about the institu-
tional and normative challenges of border-crossing law and regulatory governance 
with deeper questions concerning the form and legitimacy of law. More than being 
merely another legal “field,” transnational law, then, might better be understood as 
a methodological lens through which to scrutinize the emerging and evolving actors, 
norms and processes both within and beyond the confines of the nation-state, a 
region or a municipality, a group or any other form of collective.23
Seen from this angle, the recent proposal made by Terence Halliday and Greg-
ory Shaffer for a concept of “transnational legal ordering” emerges in the here de-
scribed, contested realm of transnational law debates, which are, as we saw, part of 
a much larger investigation into law’s relationship to globalization.24 In the follow-
ing pages, I will attempt to draw out the implications of these debates for a project 
such as Halliday’s and Shaffer’s by showing how proposals of transnational legal-
political order design require us to critically interrogate the underlying assumptions 
that inform our model building. I will argue that one of the most pertinent assump-
tions in the transnational legal order (TLO) model is the idea of the state not only 
as a still relatively stable institutional environment but also as a reliable guarantor of 
public good delivery. In light of the state’s historical and symbolic prominence in 
the Western legal and political imagination in both these respects25, there is a need 
to engage with the significance of the state, first, by revisiting a well-known story 
about the erosion of the welfare state under the conditions of globalization from 
the perspectives of both public and private law (II), before calling into question the 
alleged universality of the underlying assumptions regarding the state in that account 
(III). The next section will address concerns about the dominance of Rule of Law 
stories as they have been voiced by post-colonial scholars, before exploring the ways 
in which we trace the fragility of global law’s “intimations”26 in the emerging spaces 
of global legal imagination, and intervention (IV). In the concluding section, we will 
engage with the methodological consequences of the foregoing analysis of transna-
tional regulatory arrangements. Understanding transnational law less as a neatly de-
marcated field of law, but rather as a methodological framework through which it 
might be possible to keep the historical (however parochial) stories in play without 
universalizing them and with a view to drawing on diverse sources and backgrounds 
of world wide poverty); LEIF WENAR, BLOOD OIL: TYRANTS, VIOLENCE, AND THE RULES THAT RUN 
THE WORLD (2016) (arguing for the creation of a global initiative to address the resource curse). 
23.  See Peer Zumbansen, Defining the Space of Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global Governance 
and Legal Pluralism, 21 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 305, 308 (2012) (elaborating on the idea of 
“actors, norms and processes”). 
24.  See HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS AND INNOVATIONS 
(THOMAS HALE & DAVID HELD EDS., 2011) and in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 3 (Terence 
Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015). 
25.  See MARTIN LOUGHLIN, THE FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 2010); 
Armin Bogdandy, Philipp Dann & Matthias Goldmann, Developing the Publicness of Public International Law: 
Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities, 9 GERMAN L. J. 1375, 1381 (2008). 
26.  This term is used by NEIL WALKER, INTIMATIONS OF GLOBAL LAW (2015). 
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in the categorization and classification of emerging transnational governance struc-
tures, the article will suggest the triad of actors, norms and processes as a robust 
and promising conceptual framework to capture the institutional and normative 
challenges arising from the transnationalization of law (V). 
II. STATE TRANSFORMATION AND TRANSNATIONALIZATION: PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE LAW STORIES
Considering how many ways there are to tell the story of law’s globalization, a 
promising approach might be to distinguish between the angles from which we tell 
these stories. One such angle might be that of the state, and more precisely that of 
the Western nation-state as reference and model, against which and in distinction 
from which legal-political formations on the global level are being described, ana-
lyzed, and analogized. That seems the manner in which constitutional law scholars 
have been approaching the issue – and with good reason.27 Whether the prominence 
of state-based legal ordering in the twentieth century in the West is enough of a 
justification to continue to develop theories of law in a global context in relation to 
an, after all, historically contingent and, as a result, symbolically charged, notion of 
the state is another question. What Halliday and Shaffer offer us in this context is 
more promising than the cliché public lawyer invoking “the state” each time a con-
cern regarding a regulatory regime’s legitimacy is called into question. In their ex-
tremely careful and empirically based conceptualization of transnational legal or-
ders, we find, instead, a public law approach being put to a test, that is to say, that 
Halliday and Shaffer set out to complement in a convincing manner the otherwise 
private law-based narratives around transnational law through the development of 
a public law-oriented and socio-legally grounded, analytical framework. Not only 
has such a complementing analysis been much needed ever since both progressive 
and conservative legal theorists battled each other over the value of the law mer-
chant. But, even more importantly, perhaps, is the public law orientation of TLOs 
that allows us to trace the normative and ideological underpinnings of the ways in 
which different scholars localize and situate norms with regard to “public” or “pri-
vate” law. 
At least partly echoing this approach, some administrative lawyers have been 
creatively thinking about transporting established and well-tested categories from 
the domestic into the global (administrative) realm.28 Apart from preventing us from 
being “empty-handed” when looking for the “what” and “where” of law on the 
global level, an analysis through analogy might prove productive in allowing us to 
27.  See BARDO FASSBENDER, THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AS THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (2009); Anne Peters, The Merits of Global Constitutionalism, 16 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 397, 400 (2009) (arguing that global constitutionalism is not just a ‘paper 
tiger’, but can be seen as “a perspective which might bring into focus the right questions of fairness, 
justice, and effectiveness.”). 
28.  Benedict Kingsbury et al., Global Governance as Administration—National and Transnational Ap-
proaches to Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 3-4 (2005). 
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identify gaps and shortcomings in the translation process. Such gaps, it seems, are 
the more obvious the higher the political stakes of the legal field are or the more 
precarious the interests that come into view. Surely, labour law has been an oft-cited 
example of a field the erosion of which on the domestic level in terms of labour 
market flexibilization and decreasing union density seems largely to become exac-
erbated in relation to multinational companies’ apparently free-wheeling activities 
around the globe.29
In contrast to stories of translation or friction, as the case might be, accounts 
of “global law” might also arise in response to the proliferation of global phenom-
ena and, indeed, globe-spanning regulatory challenges. The incredibly complex, 
multi-tiered and hyper-dynamic proliferation of so-called “9/11 law” might be a 
case in point. Created “in response,” as it was argued, to the attacks on September 
11th, 2001, the global “war against terror” has since become permanent and, prob-
lematically, “unremarkable.”30 Compare this to another global field of legal regula-
tion, climate change law. Considering, in contrast to 9/11 law, a different set of 
contested and debated ideological and political stakes,31 climate change governance 
has been at the center of attention, both domestically and globally.32 The compari-
son between the “war against terror” and the equally unwieldy and multifaceted 
constellation of actors, norms and processes that make up transnational and global 
climate change governance,33 illustrates the complexity of the legal architecture we 
29.  This observation is not a new one. See, e.g., David M. Trubek et al., Global Restructuring and 
the Law: Studies of the Internationalization of Legal Fields and the Creation of Transitional Arenas, 44 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 407, 409–10 (1994); see also Harry W. Arthurs, Labour Law Without the State, 46 U. TORONTO
L. J. 1, 1 (1996) (highlighting the historically long-existing ambivalence already within domestic law of 
the relationship between law and labour). 
30.  Frédéric Mégret, ‘War’? Legal Semantics and the Move to Violence, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 361, 378 
(2002) (stating, “There may still be a valid right to self-defence to the extent that it can be proved that 
further attacks are imminent. But, in seeking to justify the contours of a continuous right to self-defence 
beyond such specific attacks, there exists a real danger that, in a world of increasingly complex security 
dilemmas, one can end up justifying a permanent recourse to armed violence that is the precise antith-
esis of what self-defence was supposed to be.”); see also CLIVE WALKER, TERRORISM AND THE LAW
48 (Lord Carlile of Berriew QC, Lord Ken McDonald QC & Sir David Omand eds., 2011) (stating, 
“One [persistent trend] is the permanence of the special provisions against terrorism. This permanence 
is increasingly unremarkable.”). 
31.  Amanda Machin, Rethinking Political Contestation over Climate Change 7 (The Neth. Sci. Counsel 
for Gov’t Policy, Working Paper No. 10, 2015) (highlighting how the “socio-political atmosphere 
around this issue has intensified and diversified; it has heated up and dispersed out, garnering the at-
tention of economists and philosophers, business and engineers, politicians and citizens. The world 
today features climate camps, climate marches, climate ribbons, climate refugees, climate summits, cli-
mate engineering [. . .], climate deniers and climate activists.”). 
32.  See Michal Nachmany, 2015 GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION STUDY (2015), 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Global_climate_legislation 
_study_20151.pdf; Stephen Minas, The Rise of Transnational Networks in Climate Change Governance: A Study 
in Hybridity 2–3 (TLI Think! Paper No. 05, 2015) (arguing that the “diffusion and proliferation of climate 
governance necessitate a reconceptualization of the global response to climate change, informed by 
theoretical and empirical work on innovations in global governance.”), http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2698561. 
33.  Minas, supra note 32, at 3. 
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are faced with. At the same time, this complexity does neither come “out of no-
where” nor were (or, in fact, are) such forms of legal-regulatory differentiation un-
known to the modern state.34 The ensuing questions regarding the continuity, par-
allels or analogies between state-internal and transnational transformations of 
regulatory governance are an important part of the unfolding investigation into the 
nature and scope of transnational law. Even in the absence of comprehensive or all-
satisfying answers to some of these questions, we need to recognize the depth of 
connection between a legal (as well as sociological and political) analysis that has 
been directed at the (domestic) Rule of Law and the welfare state, on the one hand, 
and the emerging formations of transnational regulatory governance, on the other.35
It can hardly surprise, then, that we are today, in view of the dramatic changes that 
mark the transformation of the twentieth-century Rule of Law, interventionist and 
welfare state,36 faced with complex phenomena of transnational replay of domestic 
regulatory and normative challenges on the global level.37 This replay occurs in nu-
merous, sometimes ambiguous, manners and requires critical theoretical responses 
we have been developing within the domestic context. 
Considering the significant conceptual transplants on the one hand38 and the 
dramatic changes of long-time prevalent geopolitical and economic power dynamics 
on the other,39 a further challenge unfolds with regard to the frequent resorting to 
34.  See Colin Scott, Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post-regulatory State, in THE
POLITICS OF REGULATION: INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY REFORMS FOR THE AGE OF 
GOVERNANCE 145 (Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur eds., 2004), 148 (describing the features of a 
functionally differentiated administrative-regulatory state). 
35.  Saskia Sassen, The State and Globalization, in THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 91, 91 (Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002) (stating, “A key 
organizing proposition . . . is the embeddedness of much of globalization in national territory, that is to 
say, in a geographic terrain that has been encased in an elaborate set of national laws and administrative 
capacities.”). 
36.  For an excellent historical analysis with a focus on the U.S. see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992); Orly 
Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004); see also the comparative overview by Mark Bevir et al., Traditions of Governance: 
Interpreting the Changing Role of the Public Sector, Univ. of Cal. eScholarship Repository (2003), available at 
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0pv7z35s. 
37.  See generally Alfred C. Aman Jr., The Limits of Globalization and the Future of Administrative Law: 
From Government to Governance, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 379 (2001); Michel Rosenfeld, Rethinking 
Constitutional Ordering in an Era of Legal and Ideological Pluralism, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 415 (2008) (discussing 
the development that the twentieth-century rule of law is undergoing). 
38.  See generally Kingsbury, supra note 28, at 30; Katharina Pistor, Of Legal Transplants, Legal 
Irritants, and Economic Development, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL FLOWS IN A GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 347 (Peter Cornelius & Bruce Kogut eds., 2003); Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Private Reg-
ulatory Governance: Ambiguities of Public Authority and Private Power, 76 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117 (2013), 
at 128. http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4364&context=lcp 
39.  Pablo Solon, The Changing Geopolitics of Trade, FOCUS ON THE GLOBAL SOUTH, http://fo-
cusweb.org/content/changing-geopolitics-trade-old-and-new-players-slowdown (last visited Decem-
ber 12, 2015) (stating, “In its 18 years of existence, the situation of the WTO has changed. China and 
recently Russia have become members of the WTO. Today, the old “big four” have reduced their share 
to 49.9 percent of global exports of goods while the BRICS countries now represent 17.4 percent of 
the global market of commodities.”). 
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“domestic” experiences with state transformation in trying to figure out adequate 
administrative solutions on the global level. With significant shifts occurring in 
terms of which domestic experiences—other than those of the U.S. or Europe as 
the usual suspects—one today would need to take seriously in order to get an ade-
quate understanding of who does what in international political economy,40 it is 
becoming clearer that traditional comparisons between the domestic state of things 
(regularly associated with the post-World War II nation and welfare state41) and a 
global sphere have become rather questionable. Seen in connection with concurring 
globalizing developments from health scares, over security to an increasing instan-
tiation of a post-national criminal law,42 the changes in international political econ-
omy prompt a serious reconsideration and remaking of the analytical framing de-
vices with which we can hope to capture “global” lawmaking and governance 
processes. “This opening frontier stands at the borders of several scholarly fields 
that only recently are becoming aware of benefits to increased traffic across their 
intellectual boundaries: international law, jurisprudence, international organizations 
(IOs) and international relations (IR), comparative politics, law and development, 
economic development, international human rights, globalization of law, interna-
tional political economy, institutional economics, political philosophy, world society 
and world systems theories, an anthropology of global institutions, and a social psy-
chology of legitimacy.”43
The task at hand is two-fold: on the one hand, we need to effectively trace the 
uploading but also the already highlighted theoretical and ideological replay of West-
ern-originating concepts of economic governance in the global context at a time, 
where “varieties of capitalism,” state-owned enterprises and the role of the state in 
governing the economy before, during and since the financial crisis are more con-
tested than ever.44But, on the other hand, we will have to look elsewhere through 
the help of different conceptual lenses in order to learn from domestic administra-
tive governance experiences of this or that country, without then being blind to 
novel institutional developments in the transnational realm. Comparative studies of 
transnationalized regulatory regimes as they are unfolding on the global level45
40.  See Roselyn Hsueh, China and India in the Age of Globalization: Sectoral Variation in Postliberali-
zation Regulation, 45 COMP. POL. STUD. 32, 36 (2012). 
41.  See, e.g., John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberal-
ism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT’L ORG. 379 (1982). 
42.  See the contributions by Jessica Roher et al., Introduction, Transnational Criminal Law, 6 
TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 1 (2015). 
43.  Terence Halliday, Recursivity of Global Normmaking: A Sociolegal Agenda, 5 ANN. REV.
L. AND SOC. SCI. 263, 264 (2009). 
44.  Anke Hassel, Adjustments in the Eurozone: Varieties of Capitalism and the Crisis in Southern Europe,
(London Sch. of Econ. ‘Europe in Question,’ Paper No. 76, 2014), http://www.lse.ac.uk 
/europeanInstitute/LEQS%20Discussion%20Paper%20Series/LEQSPaper76.pdf; see, in historical 
perspective, the contributions to the groundbreaking collection VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE 
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter Hall & David Soskice eds., 
2001). 
45.  See the impressive examples in HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
INSTITUTIONS AND INNOVATIONS (THOMAS HALE & DAVID HELD EDS., 2011) and in 
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through an interaction of domestic, global and reciprocal norm-creation would con-
stitute important components of a toolkit fit for such a purpose. 
In light, however, of this observation and with a view to the host of disciplines 
already employed to cast light on global norm-making processes, the potential of a 
legal positivist, state-centered model of law might be limited.  Seen, by contrast, 
through a lens of long-standing socio-legal critiques of legal-positivist accounts, 
law’s seat at the table of interdisciplinary global governance studies seems less un-
certain. That could particularly be true, taking into account the pertinent analysis 
that the Legal Realists brought to bear upon the interaction between allegedly sep-
arate spheres of political and economic power under the rubric of “public” versus 
“private.”46 With a view to the pressing governance challenges in global economic 
regulation today, it appears as if a critique of the categories and qualifications with 
which different spheres of political authority and, thus, of legitimacy, are being dis-
tinguished along the lines of public versus private or state versus market is crucial in that 
it offers insight into the connections as well as the continuities between struggles over 
power and democratic agency within and beyond the nation state’s confines.47
One way in which the already mentioned private law bias of some forms of 
transnational legal theory needs to be revisited is in relationship to the way in which 
we understand emerging transnational regulatory regimes on a normative level. It is 
important to recall that the transnational private and commercial lawyers of the 
1960s saw little need to problematize the category “private” as such, because the 
main demarcating line was perceived to be running between (autonomous, transna-
tional) “law” and the (potentially intervening, restraining) “state” rather than be-
tween “public” and “private” law. The relative triumph of this view on both the 
transnational and domestic levels48 appears to continue to hold true today, if not 
unchallenged, then nevertheless undestroyed.49 It is because of the pervasiveness of 
its characterization of transnational law as private law and the claim of it being an 
“autonomous” legal order50 that we need to revisit the public/private distinction in 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 3 (Terence Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015). For a concise 
analysis of how ‘globalized’ regimes originate on the level of the nation state, see Saskia Sassen, The State 
and Economic Globalization: Any Implications for International Law?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 109 (2000) and Sassen, 
supra note 35. 
46.  See, e.g., Hale, Coercion, supra note 16; Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, supra note 12; for a 
powerful application in today’s context of transnational governance see Fleur Johns, Performing Power: The 
Deal, Corporate Rule, and the Constitution of Global Legal Order, 34 J. L. & SOC’Y 116 (2007). 
47.  See A. Claire Cutler, Artifice, Ideology and Paradox: the Public/Private Distinction in International 
Law, 4 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 261, 262 (1997); Johns, Performing Power, supra note 46, at 136 
(highlighting the insight gained from the legal realist scholar, Robert Hale, into the value of addressing 
even the smallest questions of detail in the search for the space of political agency rather than trying to 
assert an overarching theory). 
48.  Berger, supra note 6 (arguing for the autonomy of transnational private law from the state). 
But see Peer Zumbansen, Piercing the Legal Veil: Commercial Arbitration and Transnational Law, 8 EUR. L. J. 
400 (2002), 410 (highlighting the limited review of arbitral awards by state courts). 
49.  See Cutler, Common Sense, supra note 10. 
50.  Berger, supra note 6; GAILLARD, supra note 3. 
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this context. On the level of historical development and symbolic weight, the dis-
tinction between public and private law remains significant, especially when we trace 
the power associated with each.51 Meanwhile, scholars grounded in areas related to 
market governance such as contract, commercial or corporate law, considered pri-
vate law as the appropriate governance framework when searching for a legal ap-
proach to address and structure emerging hybrid regulatory regimes.52 This prefer-
ence for private law occurs against the background of a long and contested history 
of demarcating spheres of public and private, state and market, as short-forms of 
normative universes,53 and is, as such, tied to distinct associations regarding state 
order. In other words, the sympathies for a private law solution over a public law 
one make sense within the context of an established system of political references 
and routinized arguments that work so effectively precisely because what is at stake 
is presented as a practical choice,54 while it is not openly making a statement about 
the nature (or the political value) of the legal order as such. 
But, how does the public/private divide play out in what Halliday and Shaffer 
describe as a “transnational legal order”? While the norm-making processes be-
tween the domestic and global levels, in turn, give rise to patterns of “transnational 
legal ordering” in both institutional and normative respects,55 the world-creating 
effects of references to “private” or “public” appear to have become infinitely more 
difficult to track down. Where we are left without clearly identifiable or applicable 
constitutional texts, clearly identifiable and historically situated actors of recognized 
ideological stance, and without a judiciary to provide a forum for the space of po-
litical critique of law, the public/private distinction is becoming strangely amor-
phous.56
Halliday and Shaffer, for the time being, seem to be able to escape both the 
need to having to choose between “public” and “private” as labels for particular 
TLOs and the challenge of satisfyingly responding to concerns around legitimacy, 
51.  See A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: TRANSNATIONAL 
MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2003). 
52.  Gralf-Peter Calliess, Reflexive Transnational Law The Privatisation of Civil Law and the Civilisation 
of Private Law, 23 Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 185 (2002); Christian Joerges, The Science of Private Law 
and the Nation-State, in THE EUROPEANIZATION OF LAW. THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION 47 (Francis Snyder ed., 2000). 
53.  David Campbell, Reflexivity and Welfarism in the Modern Law of Contract, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 477 (2000). 
54.  See the brilliant analysis by Duncan Kennedy, The Political Stakes in ‘Merely Technical’ Issues in 
Contract Law, 10 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 7 (2001) 
55.  Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Ordering and State Change, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDERING AND STATE CHANGe 1-23 (Gregory Shaffer ed., 2013), 7-10 . See also Terence C. Halliday 
& Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 3-72 (Terence C. 
Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015), 11: “To capture the dynamic of the formation and institution-
alization of TLOs, we stipulate that a transnational legal order is legal when it involves international or 
transnational legal organizations or networks, and assumes a recognizable legal form.” 
56.  See Peer Zumbansen, Introduction to Private Ordering in a Globalizing World: Still Searching for the 
Basis of Contract, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 181 (2007); Peer Zumbansen, Lochner Disembedded: 
The Anxieties of Law in a Global Context, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 29 (2013). 
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because the model elegantly navigates the divide without ever having to reject or 
overcome it. To the degree that we would find ourselves applying the label “private” 
to, say, only a segment or a particular level of a transnational regulatory regime in 
the form of a TLO, we could justify that with reference to the nature of the actors 
involved. While to endorse the “private” nature of a TLO in part or altogether 
would surely raise concerns with regard to the significance of this labeling, the pre-
vailing ambivalence in that regard somehow displaces the problem. Already within 
legal theory debates on the nation-state level, legal realists and, later, feminist legal 
scholars had effectively deconstructed the public/private distinction as an instru-
ment of domination.57 Similarly, critical private law scholars were able to show that 
in both modern, so-called “mixed economies” (characterized by Keynesian market-
shaping policies)58 and in transnational regulatory regimes59 the public-private dis-
tinction was often used to mask the legally regulated and political nature of allegedly 
self-regulating markets.60 Now, confronted with a largely descriptive mapping of 
multilevel and recursively structured TLOs, the distinction between public and pri-
vate, as it emerged in the context of an evolving modern nation-state61 and its at-
tending political problems, we need to reconceptualize the prerequisites for a prac-
tical use of the public/private distinction. Transnational regulatory governance, 
including the examples depicted within the TLO research project, is of a complexity 
today that the burning question remains whether such regimes can be adequately 
57.  Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L .J. 454 (1908); Frances Olsen, Constitutional 
Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Distinction, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 319 (1993) (describing three 
historical waves of feminist critique of the public/private distinction in U.S. law). 
58.  See ANDREW SHONFIELD, MODERN CAPITALISM. THE CHANGING BALANCE OF PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE POWER (1965); Günter Frankenberg, Why Care?—The Trouble with Social Rights, 17 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1365 (1996). 
59.  Fabrizio Cafaggi, New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation (European Univ. Inst. 
Robert Schuman Ctr. for Advanced Stud., Working Paper No. 53, 2010), http://cadmus.eui.eu 
/bitstream/handle/1814/15284/RSCAS_2010_53.pdf?sequence=1; Peer Zumbansen, Law and Legal 
Pluralism: Hybridity in Transnational Governance, in REGULATORY HYBRIDIZATION IN THE 
TRANSNATIONAL SPHERE 49 (Paulius Jur ys, Poul F. Kjaer & Ren Yatsunami eds., 2013). 
60.  Zumbansen, Piercing the Legal Veil, supra note 48, 412-414. See also GRALF-PETER CALLIESS 
& PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL 
PRIVATE LAW (2010), 60: 
As markets are believed to pick up where (exhausted) national governments have left off, 
they form an integral part of a narrative of natural evolution. In this narrative, conflicts over 
goals of regulation and principles of political market governance are transposed into strategic 
options put forward by states engaged in global regulatory competition, or into preferences 
and choices by market participants and (global) consumers. In these accounts, markets are 
promoted to assume the role of regulators, however, without any regard to their constituted, 
legal nature, an insight gained so long ago, that the general amnesia that seems to have taken 
hold of the market fundamentalists could almost be forgiven. 
[footnotes omitted] 
61.  Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Four Senses of the Public Law-Private Law Distinction, 9 HARV. J. L.
& PUBL. POL’Y 267, 268 (1986) (arguing that the distinction is tied “to the kind of standard being 
applied to individual conduct”); see also contributions to PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN THOUGHT AND 
PRACTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON A GRAND DICHOTOMY 204-68 (Jeff Weintraub & Krishnan Kumar 
eds., 1997) (exploring the public-private nature of ‘home’ and focusing on the intersection between 
private rights and public regulation in urban zoning). 
174 UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative Law [Vol. 1:161 
mapped along the delineations of public or private law.  Whether we are concerned 
with standard-setting in different areas considered “technical” such as forestry,62
electricity,63 accounting,64 labor65 and environmental conditions within global sup-
ply chains,66 or with the complex arrangements around climate change govern-
ance,67 the task of understanding and conceptualizing such regimes against the back-
ground of the blurred lines of public and private law seems daunting. This interim 
finding, however, needs to be further assessed to the degree that we explain the 
emergence of TLOs as, at least in part, a response to the inadequacy of state-based 
regulatory instruments in the face of globalized production and dissemination re-
gimes.68
As a result, then, we are on shifting grounds when trying to mobilize the pub-
lic/private distinction to highlight the ideological stakes in the context of transna-
tional regime analysis. At the same time, however, the distinction continues to make 
its appearance in at least a number of the fast emerging and proliferating transna-
tional regulatory regimes, for which an ever more differentiated vocabulary appears 
to be forthcoming. Notions such as “private authority”69 or “Transnational Private 
Regulatory Governance” (TPRG)70 illustrate the dynamics of this intriguing and 
fast-evolving laboratory of doctrinal and conceptual analysis, where much of the 
62.  Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: the Case of Forestry,
17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 47 (2006). 
63.  TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF 
REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (2011). 
64.  See generally Walter Mattli & Tim Büthe, Global Private Governance: Lessons from a National Model 
of Setting Standards in Accounting, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225 (2005); Dieter Kerwer, Rules that Many 
Use: Standards and Global Regulation, 18 Governance 611 (2005). 
65.  RICHARD M. LOCKE, THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF PRIVATE POWER: PROMOTING 
LABOR STANDARDS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2013). 
66.  See Daniel J. Fiorino & Manjyot Bhan, Environmental Regulation with Supply Chains: Comparing 
Private and Public Regulation, American Univ. Sch. of Pub. Affairs, Ctr. for Envtl. Policy Working Paper 
No. 4, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2317342 (arguing that the increase 
in private environmental supply chain regulation has not fully displaced public regulation and benefits 
both the firm and society). 
67.  Daniel Bodansky, Climate Change: Transnational Legal Order or Disorder? in TRANSNATIONAL 
LEGAL ORDERS 287 (Terence Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, eds., 2015); Sigrid Boysen, Grundfragen des 
transnationalen Klimaschutzrechts, 50 Archiv des Völkerrechts 377 (2012). 
68.  This point is made repeatedly by scholars in TPRG and TLO. See Kenneth W. Abbott, 
Engaging the public and the private in global sustainability governance, 88 INT’L AFF. 543 (2012); see generally 
Halliday & Shaffer, supra, note 45. 
69.  A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler & Tony Porter, Private Authority and International Affairs, in
PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 3–28 (A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler & Tony 
Porter, eds., 1999) (examining why the “framework of governance for international affairs increasingly 
is created and maintained by the private sector and not state or interstate organizations.” Id. at 3); see 
also Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New 
Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501 (2009). 
70.  See, e.g., contributions to the Symposium, Transnational Private Regulatory Governance: Regimes, 
Dialogue, Constitutionalization,13 GERMAN L. J. 1269-1578 (2012); see also Tim Bartley, Institutional Emer-
gence in an Era of Globalization: The Rise of Transnational Private Regulation of Labor and Environmental Condi-
tions, 113 AM. J. SOC. 297 (2007). 
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ongoing conceptual analysis is directly tied to empirical field work,71 while the re-
sulting architecture along with the investigation of the arising normative challenges 
remain largely unsettled.72 This is even more so the case when the emerging data 
sets complicate an analysis along the lines of public and private, because the con-
stellations of actors defy a characterization according to such binaries. While that 
makes sense, arguably, when we think of public and private as adjectives to identify 
clearly allocated types of authority, the diffusion of public/private has an impact on 
our acquired routines of addressing the political stakes that the however contested 
application of the binary would regularly expose—domestically as well as transna-
tionally.73 The question, which poses itself with increasing urgency with the rise of 
more and more hybrid regulatory regimes from, say, the Equator Principles74 to 
Private Military and Security Companies (PMSC),75 concerns the ways in which the 
now available rich descriptive accounts of transnational governance may be exposed 
to a comprehensive normative critique. 
Meanwhile, and the pervasiveness and timeliness of the TLO project is a pow-
erful illustration of this, the evidence of the fast-evolving dynamics of transnational 
norm-creation not only speak for themselves but also provide a good deal of the 
substance of the ongoing theoretical enterprise. As a consequence, a lot of the cur-
rent theory-design work, whether that is in the TLO project of Halliday and Shaffer, 
in Cassese’s and his colleagues’ impressive array of on-the-ground GAL studies, in 
Cafaggi’s, Senden’s and Scott’s TPRG examples or in Eberlein’s, Abbott’s, Black’s, 
Meidinger’s and Wood’s Transnational Business Governance Interactions,76 is based on 
such a wealth of empirical data, that this tremendous contribution alone furthers 
our understanding of the actual operation of transnational regulatory regimes. 
Engagements with many of the forms of transnational regulatory governance 
emerge from different starting points and with different, competing preferences, 
some of which express a deep-running concern about where to properly situate the 
71.  THE CHALLENGE OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE REGULATION: CONCEPTUAL AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES 1–188 (Colin Scott et al. eds., 2011); Gralf-Peter Calliess, Hermann Hoff-
mann & Jens M.  Mertens, The Transnationalisation of Commercial Law (ZenTra Working Paper in Trans-
national Studies, No. 04, 2012) (http://ssrn.com/abstract=2179563). 
72.  See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer’s reference to Steiner’s, Vagts’ and Koh’s seminal 1994 casebook 
on Transnational Legal Problems, in Shaffer, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERING AND STATE 
CHANGE, supra note 55, at 5. Shaffer rightly observes that Steiner, Vagts and Koh ‘conceptualize’ 
(rather than define) transnational law. More remarkably, even, the 1994 casebook which the same au-
thors in their 1996 volume on “Transnational Business Problems” reference as providing the founda-
tion of their transnational legal theory work, does contain neither a definition of ‘transnational law’ nor 
is transnational law a self-standing index item in the book. 
73.  Compare Carol Harlow, “Public” and “Private” Law: Definition without Distinction, 43 MOD. L.
REV. 241 (1980), with Cutler, Artifice, Ideology and Paradox, supra note 47. 
74.  See John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Global Banks as Global Sustainability Regulators?: 
The Equator Principles, 33 LAW & POL’Y 542 (2011). 
75.  Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, https://www 
.globalpolicy.org/pmscs.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2016). 
76.  Burkard Eberlein, Kenneth W. Abbott, Julia Black, Errol Meidinger & Stepan Wood, Trans-
national business governance interactions: Conceptualization and framework for analysis, 8 REG. & GOVERNANCE
1 (2014). 
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state in all of this,77 while others place the question of politics in a still wider context 
of global ethics and democratic theory.78 In Halliday’s and Shaffer’s concept of 
TLO, we find both a remarkable decentering of the state and its reconsideration as 
a crucial legal-political actor in a regulatory space marked by an interaction in be-
tween different levels of norm-making. Their depiction of recursivity provides us 
with a clearer view on the concrete forms of agency that are assumed by state and 
non-state actors in upward and downward oriented processes of norm creation. 
Instead of choosing in the debate between the state’s “retreat 
79 or “return”80, Halliday and Shaffer use the TLO concept with the connections 
between state transformation (the concrete drivers and symptoms of which need to 
be illustrated in more detail, however) and the functionally driven regulatory re-
gimes, rather than forcing a decision between dismissing or resurrecting the state 
on more or less ideological terms. In that respect, the proposed idea of TLOs as 
framing devices for recursive norm-creation by states, transnational regimes and 
between them keeps the state “in play” while it avoids bringing the state “back in” 
as a global lion tamer. 
In that regard, our discussion of the challenges of evaluating normative impli-
cations of the TLO framework echoes the observations already made by the above-
mentioned scholars and their work on different transnational regulatory governance 
formations. What we can see as a common theme throughout these investigations 
is the awareness of devising more fine-tuned analytical instruments to map the in-
stitutional dimensions much more effectively. But, what must interest us here are 
the ways in which these arrangements can be opened to normative critique. More 
directly, market-governance oriented regimes such as Equator Principles81 or, say, 
corporate social responsibility frameworks built around the collaboration between 
IOs and private business82 point to basic questions regarding justice, inequality, and 
distribution in a capitalist global system more directly than approaches that remain 
seemingly more attached to an analysis of geopolitical state agency.83 But, at the 
same time, it is the growing complexity of transnational governance regimes, par-
ticularly in their elusiveness with regard to the public/private divide that renders 
77.  Martin Loughlin, What is Constitutionalisation? in THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM?
47, 47 (Petra Dobner & Martin Loughlin eds., 2010) (examining “whether the emerging phenomenon 
of constitutionalisation signals the global triumph of constitutionalism, its demise, or its transmuta-
tion.”). 
78.  Regina Kreide, The Ambivalence of Juridification. On Legitimate Governance in the International Con-
text, 2 GLOBAL JUST. 18 (2009). 
79.  See SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN THE 
WORLD ECONOMY (Steve Smith et al. eds., 1996). 
80.  See José E. Alvarez, The Return of the State, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 223 (2011). 
81.  See, in that regard, the contributions to the Symposium on Equator Principles, Isabel Feicht-
ner & Manuel Wörsdörfer, 10 Years Equator Principles: A Transdisciplinary Inquiry, 5 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL
THEORY 409-416 (2014). 
82.  Wesley Cragg, Human Rights and Business Ethics: Fashioning a New Social Contract, 27 
J. Bus. Ethics 205 (2000); John G. Ruggie, Just Business. Multinational Corporations and Human Rights 
(2013). 
83.  Halliday & Shaffer, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 45, at 40. 
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their normative evaluation increasingly difficult. As we have seen, the way we attach 
labels of “private” or “public” to different forms of regulatory governance might 
still say more about their institutional and normative entanglements in particular 
domestic regulatory contexts than effectively advance our understanding of prolif-
erating patterns of transnational governance. Nevertheless, as these regimes reflect 
extensive forms of decentered, multi-tiered regulatory arrangements which result in 
flexible, evolving and fluid combinations of hard and soft, formal and informal reg-
ulatory elements,84 the task of both mapping and critiquing them remains ever more 
urgent.
Unsurprisingly, then, the observation that the current transnationalization of 
regulatory regimes in a globally functionally-differentiated society is only partially 
receptive to the same normative critique that the waning welfare states in Western 
democracies prompted in the 1980s,85 is hardly novel. Instead, a timely critical pro-
ject today is itself in need of a comprehensive grounding of its premises and starting 
points in a post-national, post-democratic context.86 In other words, without the 
chess piece of the regulatory state and its redistributive politics as bargaining token, 
there is now a much greater need to develop a contextual critique within transna-
tional regulatory regimes such as labour and human rights law. These fields require 
our attention for their normative and institutional stakes are particularly high, while 
the traditional, nation-state based reference points of “state” vs. “market” or “pub-
lic” vs. “private” are of only limited value in mobilizing an effective normative as-
sessment.87 And so we must allow ourselves to take a step away from the “state” as 
reference point for modern political and legal theory. Stepping away, then, might 
84.  Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 
54 Int’l Org. 421 (2000); THE CHALLENGE OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE REGULATION:
CONCEPTUAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES 1-188 (Colin Scott et al. eds., 2011).  
85.  See the analysis in JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE NEW OBSCURITY: THE CRISIS OF THE 
WELFARE STATE AND THE EXHAUSTION OF UTOPIAN ENERGIES, IN THE NEW CONSERVATISM:
CULTURAL CRITICISM AND THE HISTORIANS’ DEBATE 48-70 (SHIERRY WEBER NICHOLSEN ED. AND 
TRANS., 1989). 
86.  Steven Bernstein & Benjamin Cashore, Can Non-State Global Governance be Legitimate? An 
Analytical Framework, 1 Reg. & Governance 347 (2007); COLIN CROUCH, THE STRANGE NON-DEATH 
OF NEOLIBERALISM 138 (2011) (drawing on John Ruggie’s work as Special Representative of the United 
Nations’ Secretary General, charged with the elaboration of norms for Multinational Corporations, to 
argue that “[g]lobal firms have become so powerful that they cannot avoid political attention even if 
political actors can exercise little direct leverage over them.” See also Zumbansen, Transnational Private 
Regulatory Governance, supra note 38, at 117 (observing that the proliferation of private norm-making 
illustrates the pressure on the state to redefine its regulatory abilities); THE INVISIBLE COMMITTEE: TO
OUR FRIENDS (Robert Hurley trans., 2015) (2014). 
87.  1 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L TRANSNAT’L AND COMP L. (2016) See Kevin Kolben, Transnational 
Labor Regulation and the Limits of Governance, 12 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 403 (2011); Katherine Van 
Wezel Stone, Labour in the Global Economy: Four Approaches to Transnational Labour Regulation, in
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON 
ECONOMIC REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 445-477 (Joseph McCahery et al. 
eds.,1996); Harry Arthurs, Reinventing Labor Law for the Global Economy: The Benjamin Aaron Lec-
ture, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 271 (2001). 
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open the vista on different starting points for such theorizing, more problem-ori-
ented than institution-based, more responsive than prescriptive, and more receptive 
to the wide range of world depictions than “inclusive” towards other disciplines’ 
insights as if that there was much left of a safe ground to stand on. A legal theory 
thus conceived would take very little for granted, but instead attempt to embrace 
the complexity of globalized human affairs with little prejudice. We only need to 
turn our attention to the complex implications and legal challenges that have been 
arising from the tragic building collapse of the Rana Plaza garment factory outside 
Dhaka in 2013,88 the workers’ suicides of Apple Inc’s Chinese contracting partner, 
Foxconn,89 and from migrant workers’ rights abuses and deaths during the stadium 
constructions for Fifa’s 2022 Qatar World Cup,90 to make us appreciate the need to 
think about the newly emerging spaces of interaction and of reflection, which cut 
across jurisdictional boundaries. The emergence of such spatialized cases calls into 
question any legalistic attempt to delineate institutional frameworks housed, in part, 
in the domestic sphere and, in part, in a transnational realm. Instead, as the example 
of the regulatory aftermath after the Spring 2013 building collapse of Rana Plaza 
highlights, the regimes here in question are “neither here nor there.”91 Alone, the 
range of actors who were involved in creating or otherwise shaping the Accord, 
from global and local unions, to governments, business representatives and the 
ILO, labor and human rights activists and advocacy, does not fit neatly on the tra-
ditional legal map.92
III. REGULATORY GOVERNANCE: “EMBEDDED,” “DISEMBEDDED,”
“TRANSNATIONALIZED,” AND “WESTERN”
A striking feature of many of the currently circulating stories about the trans-
formation of “the state” is that they are predominantly anchored in traditions of the 
88.  Bangladesh: 2 Years After Rana Plaza, Workers Denied Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 22, 
2015), http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/22/bangladesh-2-years-after-rana-plaza-workers-denied-
rights; see also Aftermath of the Rana Plaza Tragedy: Social and Health Issues Emerge Amid Struggle for Workers’ 
Rights, LAW MARGINS, http://lawatthemargins.com/aftermath-of-the-rana-plaza-tragedy-social-and-
health-issues-emerge-amid-struggle-for-workers-rights/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2016). 
89.  Joel Johnson, 1 Million Workers. 90 Million iPhones. 17 Suicides. Who’s to Blame?, WIRED (Feb. 
28, 2011), http://www.wired.com/2011/02/ff_joelinchina/. 
90.  Rory Jones, Qatar Called to Publish World Cup Worker Death Figures: Gulf country’s human-rights 
record in spotlight following launch of FIFA investigations, WALL ST. J. (June 4, 2015), http://www.wsj.com 
/articles/qatar-called-to-publish-world-cup-worker-death-figures-1433421740. 
91.  Amy Kazmin, Bangladesh Factory Collapse a Catalyst for Workers’ Rights, FIN. TIMES (May 3, 
2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8c72524e-b3e1-11e2-ace9-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3RSl6u 
HEb; see generally, Gary Gereffi & Stacey Frederick, The Global Apparel Value Chain, Trade and the 
Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities for Developing Countries (The World Bank, Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 5281, 2010) https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986 
/3769/WPS5281.pdf?sequence=1. 
92.  Signatories, ACCORD, http://bangladeshaccord.org/signatories/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2016). 
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Western nation-state.93 As a result, the lessons we are likely to draw on when imag-
ining the emerging global legal order, might turn out to be quite skewed towards 
experiences with “modernization”94 and “civilization”95 in the West and, as such, of 
only limited use with regard to the actually existing governance challenges that face 
a pluralist and diverse global world today.96 More specifically, as scholars engage in 
sketching the institutional and normative challenges attending to an emerging, how-
ever fragmented global or transnational legal order, there is considerable risk that 
such efforts remain closely tied to a particular historical, socio-economic and polit-
ical development. Emerging propositions, while embedded in a particular, Western 
reference system, become elevated to the level of universality. Unsurprisingly, after 
a long, protracted history of colonization and decolonization97 and the establish-
ment of a conflicted post-World War II order98, after the “Washington Consen-
sus”99 and in the context of the endless global “war against terror,”100 we need to 
turn our attention to the ideological and conceptual blind spots of these narratives, 
especially with regard to the implicit claims to universality of the depicted develop-
ments as well as to the potential transplantability of core concepts of the Rule of 
Law to “developing” countries.101 Questioning the universality of the Western Rule 
93.  See generally, NEIL WALKER, INTIMATIONS OF GLOBAL LAW 23-28 (2015); ANDREW 
HURRELL, ON GLOBAL ORDER: POWER, VALUES, AND THE CONSTITUTION OF INTERNATIONAL 
SOCIETY 95–116 (2007); THEORISING THE GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER (Andrew Halpin & Volker Roe-
ben eds., 2009); PUBLIC GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (Karl-Heinz Ladeur ed., 
2004) (offering reflections on the role of the state in ongoing attempts to theorize the impact of glob-
alization on law from different starting points in law, including legal theory, philosophy of law, admin-
istrative and competition law, EU law and public international law). 
94.  RUMU SARKAR, INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW: RULE OF LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND GLOBAL FINANCE 46-53 (2009) (stating that, “The modernization theory of development, the 
predominant post-World War II school of thought, holds out the belief that modernization is a pro-
gressive, evolutionary process that should result in the transformation of less developed societies into 
Western political, social, and legal institutions.”). 
95.  Antony Anghie, Western Discourses of Sovereignty, in SOVEREIGNTY: FRONTIERS OF 
POSSIBILITY 19, 22-23 (Julie Evans, Ann Genovese, Alexander Reilly & Patrick Wolfe eds., 2013). 
96.  In that vein, see BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON 
SENSE: LAW, GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION 85–98 (2nd ed. 2002); FRANCIS DENG,
ABDULLAHI AN-NA’IM, YASH GHAI & UPENDRA BAXI, HUMAN RIGHTS: SOUTHERN VOICES 161
(William Twining ed., 2009) (introducing Upendra Baxi’s interpretation of human rights from the lived 
experiences of ‘human suffering’, particularly in the Global South); HUMAN RIGHTS FROM A THIRD 
WORLD PERSPECTIVE: CRITIQUE, HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 256-309 (José-Manuel Bar-
reto ed., 2013). 
97.  Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the 
Mandate System of the League of Nations, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 513 (2002). 
98.  SUNDHYA PAHUJA, DECOLONISING INTERNATIONAL LAW: DEVELOPMENT,
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE POLITICS OF UNIVERSALITY 44-95 (JAMES CRAWFORD & JOHN S.
BELL EDS., 2011). 
99.  Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Future of Global Governance, in THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS 
RECONSIDERED: TOWARD A NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 309 (Narcis Serra & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
eds., 2008). 
100.  See Jothie Rajah, Sinister Translations: Law’s Authority in a Post-9/11 World, 21 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 107 (2014); see also Mégret, supra note 29. 
101.  SARKAR, supra note 92; see also John Gillespie, Developing a Theoretical Framework for Evaluating 
Rule of Law Promotion in Developing Countries, in RULE OF LAW DYNAMICS: IN AN ERA OF 
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of Law story undermines the assumption that there is an “off-the-shelf,” rule-of-
law framework that lends itself in any quasi-scientific and pragmatic-technical sense 
as an export item for the various governance woes that are plaguing developing 
countries, post-conflict societies, and “failed” states around the world.102 This cri-
tique, which emerges out of a wide array of critical theory,103 post-colonial studies104
and Third World Approaches to International Law105 (TWAIL), posits the self-con-
fident rendering of the rule-of-law account depicted above as an impressive illustra-
tion of benign ignorance and, in effect, arrogance. 
In response, post-colonial scholars and, among them, TWAIL and other crit-
ical jurists have been hard at work at uncovering the discriminatory, exclusionary 
patterns of subordination, on the one hand, and the powerful routines of “normal-
izing” the exception, on the other.106 Such resistance has been directed against the 
expansion of so-called “humanitarian interventions”107 against the rhetorically en-
tangled and institutionally immensely powerful “war against terror”108 and against 
the flagrant global disparities that survive and continue to deepen – in spite of uni-
versal acclaims to the principle of sovereign equality.109 As with other innovative 
theoretical advances, TWAIL’s exact foundations and starting points are as elusive 
as the confines or boundaries of the project itself. Evolving as an internal critique 
INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 233, 240–241 (Michael Zürn, André No-
ellkaemper & Randall Peerenboom eds., 2012) (stressing the role of sociolegal and regulatory theory to 
more effectively capture what nonstate actors [operating in developing countries] think about rule of 
law (“RoL”) promotion in developing countries). 
102.  B.S. Chimni, Global Capitalism and Global Democracy: Subverting the Other?, in GLOBAL 
DEMOCRACY: NORMATIVE AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 233–253 (Daniele Archibugi et al. eds., 
2012). 
103.  David Kennedy, International Legal Structures (1987). 
104.  ARTURO ESCOBAR, ENCOUNTERING DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING 
OF THE THIRD WORLD (Sherry Ortner et al eds., 2012); DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, PROVINCIALIZING 
EUROPE: POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT AND HISTORICAL DIFFERENCE (Sherry B. Ortner el al eds., 
2000). 
105.  James Thuo Gathii, TWAIL: A Brief History of its Origins, its Decentralized Network, and a 
Tentative Bibliography, 3 TRADE L. & DEV. 26 (2011); Makau Mutua, A Critique of Rights in Transitional 
Justice: The African Experience, in RETHINKING TRANSITIONS: EQUALITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN 
SOCIETIES EMERGING FROM CONFLICT 31-45 (Gaby Oré Aguilar & Felipe Gómez Isa eds., 2011). 
106.  See the seminal work by Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of 
International Law (2005); see also Makau Mutua, What is TWAIL?, 94 AM. SOC. INT’L L. PROC. 31, 31 
(2000) (explaining “The regime of international law is illegitimate. It is a predatory system that repro-
duces and sustains the plunder and subordination of the Third World by the West.” Id.).
107.  See Anne Orford, Muscular Humanitarianism: Reading the Narratives of the New Interventionism,
10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 679, 680–81 (1999); Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Lady Doth Protest Too Much’ Kosovo, and 
the Turn to Ethics in International Law, 65 MOD. L. REV. 159, 160 (2002) (arguing “that the obsession to 
extend the law to such crises, while understandable in historical perspective, enlists political energies to 
support causes dictated by the hegemonic powers and is unresponsive to the violence and injustice that 
sustain the global everyday.” Id.)
108.  Mégret, supra note 30; Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception 
and the Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001 (2004). 
109.  M. Sornarajah, Power and Justice: Third World Resistance in International Law, 10 SING. Y.B.
INT’L L. 19 (2006); Jothie Rajah, The Gulf between Promise and Claim: Understanding International Law’s Failure 
to Decolonise, 3 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 285 (2012). 
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to universalist stances in public international law, human rights law or the still dom-
inant development concepts in association with promoting the Rule of Law as a 
globally applicable governance framework, TWAIL offers its greatest potential as a 
theoretically rigorous and empirically based undertaking that is both scholarly and 
activist, historically informed and at the same time not shying away from concrete 
political intervention. Even more remarkably then does it continue in being absent 
from most regular international law debates, let alone classroom curricula. 
Despite its fluid center,110 TWAIL’s contribution to a provincialization of the 
Western narrative of the rise and subsequent fall of the democratic welfare state 
cannot be underestimated. The skewed nature of the account becomes only too 
obvious, once it is contrasted with parallel accounts of the passing of (international) 
time,111 or with an expression of alienation or frustration regarding the alleged uni-
versality of ordering models based on the distinction between public and private, 
the state and the market, and so forth.112 It is here that we (in the West) are only 
beginning to catch glimpses of what the world might actually look like. Building on 
these reflections, we must concern ourselves with an infinitely more complex and 
pluralist story, which engages questions of social, economic, political and legal or-
der, but do so without choosing as a backdrop the allegedly sacrosanct story of the 
Rule of Law’s adventurous time travel. Inevitably, such a story must be one about 
political agency and the conditions of its operation. But, what are the forms of such 
stories, and from which angle, and from whose perspective can they be told? How 
and, importantly, by whom?
IV. LOCATING THE RULE OF LAW: HOW EXPECTATIONS CREATE, ENACT AND 
FILL SPACES
To illustrate these challenges more clearly, we need to recognize the degree to 
which many of today’s dominant globalization and Rule of Law narratives, as they 
emanate from public law and public international law discourses in the West, are in 
fact creating their own reference system. In other words, certain narratives become 
so powerful and rhetorically persuasive that they contribute to the design and fur-
nishing of regulatory, argumentative, and epistemological spaces, which become 
material in the way that they house and govern future conversations about the ends 
and means of legal ordering. Because such discursively constructed spaces furnish 
iterations of legal order in general or of the Rule of Law in particular with elements 
of both legality and legitimacy usually in response to an in itself undeniable “prob-
lem” (security, climate change, risk, poverty), they are to a large degree immune 
110.  See Gathii, supra note 104, at 27 (highlighting the ‘decentralized’ nature of TWAIL as a 
network).
111.  Sundhya Pahuja, Laws of Encounter: a Jurisdictional Account of International Law, 1 LONDON 
REV. INT’L L. 63, 73 (2013). 
112.  Fernanda Pirie, Law Before Government: Ideology and Aspiration, 30 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
207-228 (2010); Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Beyond Abyssal Thinking: From Global Lines to Ecolo-
gies of Knowledges, Eurozine (June 29, 2007) http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-06-29-santos-
en.html. 
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against any internal critique. The three spaces depicted in the following illustrate 
three exemplary cases in which a rhetoric of “obvious necessity” serves to constitute 
a comprehensive order and internally coherent reference system. These examples 
include the debate over the use of force in the face of a perceived “humanitarian 
crisis” (and, ensuing, a global terrorist “threat”). At the center of this debate is the 
juxtaposition of constitutionalism and administration rhetorics that drive much of 
lawyers’ present engagement with the conundrum of “global governance.” Another 
ingredient in the debate is, however, the fight over an adequate role of the state in 
governing global markets. In order to deconstruct these material reference spaces—
humanitarian intervention (1), global constitutionalism and global administrative 
law (2), and lex mercatoria versus state intervention (3)—we need to first clarify the 
starting points as well as the anchors of such a deconstruction. It should be obvious 
by now that the identified three spaces draw their oxygen from the Rule of Law 
trajectories outlined above. In other words, each of the here-discussed rhetorical 
spaces opens up against the backdrop of conventional rule-of-law narratives going 
unchallenged. In response, the proposal here is the following: if there is to be any 
chance for an effective deconstruction of the global world order imaginations which 
these three spaces inhabit, we need to provincialize the history and trajectory of the 
Western state and its laws by decentering and relativizing the existing accounts. One 
way of doing that might be to pay particular attention to what can be conceived as 
the significance of “our time,” directing, in other words, our interest to the moments 
and the places in which questions about the evolving legal-political order are being 
asked so that, in turn, the bias of chosen perspectives, alleged landmark moments 
and key “events” can be made visible113 and theories, perceptions and commitments 
may be engaged in dialogue from different perspectives.114
The first step in this regard is an illumination of context, something that has an 
impressively long tradition and is testified to with encouraging intensity today in 
fields such as history115 and political theory,116 but continues to enjoy a weaker sta-
tus in law and mainstream legal scholarship. With regard to the usual stories about 
the Rule of Law’s trajectory towards a welfare state before being torn apart by the 
forces of economic globalization, the particularity of perspective becomes quite ap-
parent once we place this trajectory in larger geopolitical context, allowing the in-
ternal story of Western state consolidation, industrial revolutions, economic growth 
113.  See the contributions to EVENTS: THE FORCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 91-106, 117-30
(FLEUR JOHNS, RICHARD JOYCE & SUNDHYA PAHUJA EDS., 2010); see also ISSA G. SHIVJI, WHERE IS 
UHURU? REFLECTIONS ON THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA (Godwin R. Murunga ed., 
2009). 
114.  See, for such an exposition, for example, the work by Jean Comaroff & John L. Comaroff, 
THEORY FROM THE SOUTH: OR, HOW EURO-AMERICA IS EVOLVING TOWARD AFRICA (2012); see 
also Santos, Beyond Abyssal Thinking, supra note 111. 
115.  JÜRGEN OSTERHAMMEL, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORLD: A GLOBAL 
HISTORY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (Patrick Camiller trans, 2014). 
116.  DAVID ARMITAGE, FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL THOUGHT (2012). 
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and the “rights revolution”117 to become an intimate dimension of the West’s global 
history.118 The contextualization of the most frequently referenced Rule of Law nar-
ratives allows a better understanding of where certain assertions are grounded. 
Against the background of alternative timelines and perspectives of storytelling, it 
becomes apparent that the commonly offered narratives of the relationship between 
the state and law are only “true” as long as we accept the following premises: 
1. The 20th century history of the state is correctly depicted as a pro-
gression from a formalist Rule of Law to a jurisgenerative, substantive 
law-issuing social and welfare state—prior to its demise in a compet-
itive global market. In other words, this development can be de-
scribed as one “from government to governance”.
2. The nation-state’s fate under the conditions of globalization is one of 
erosion and of “de-juridification.” 
3. There is a logical historical progression of modern state formation, 
consolidation of sovereignty, social modernization, emancipation of 
formerly unfree constituencies, juridification of all areas of societal 
activity (for better or worse), globalization of economic, cultural and 
social relations, the “end of history” (1989 ff) and, recently, “9/11” 
as “exception.” 
4. As far as non-Western populations are concerned, their history is ap-
propriately captured in an account that traces the accession of former 
colonized peoples and nations to international statehood, governed 
by the principle of sovereign equality under the UN Charter. 
But, what if these premises were altogether traced back to a very particular, 
biased, and skewed way of historical narrative? How should we engage in critically 
revisiting the ways in which we used to narrate the story? A possible approach might 
be in identifying and highlighting not what keeps these narratives apart but what 
they share. In the context of investigating the meaning and operation of the Rule of 
Law, we may ask about the relationship between “legality” and “legitimacy” which 
might be, in perhaps very different manners, terminologies and associations never-
theless inherent to both dominant and alternative accounts? 
Space 1: Humanitarian Intervention: The End of International Law, or Its Reinvention 
The here-identified space is created and constituted by cutting through limit-
less, unbounded spheres that are depicted as the real world. In this world, because 
we have before been living in a dream and now need to wake up, everything is 
117.  CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING OF THE 
REGULATORY STATE (1990); Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000, 
in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 19 (2006). 
118.  Chakrabarty, supra note 103; C.A. BAYLY, THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN WORLD 1780–
1914 (2004); JÜRGEN OSTERHAMMEL & NIELS P. PETERSSON, GLOBALIZATION: A SHORT HISTORY,
(Dona Geyer trans., 2004). 
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possible, you (who? someone? anyone?) only need to ask.119 This space is, for ex-
ample, that which is constituted in responding to a crisis. It is a space where Neo, 
quickly overcoming his shock, notes: “We need guns, lots of them. “ Trinity120 will
reply that “no one has ever tried this before.” We all know Neo’s answer: “That’s
why it’s going to work.” 121 This constellation is a tragic illustration of the Kosovo 
“crisis” of international law, of the stretching of law’s imagination in the name of 
legitimacy and of law’s pushing back in the name of legality.122 Thus, the ground 
had been laid for what Koskenniemi aptly coined international law’s “turn to eth-
ics.”123 what Anne Orford brilliantly deconstructed as international law’s normali-
zation of its exception124 and what would eventually provide much of the slippery 
justificatory basis for repeated invocations of Kosovo as “precedent,” whether in 
Iraq,125 Syria126 or elsewhere. The rhetorical avenues opened for international law’s 
normalization, the embrace of a “war against terror” within the confines of interna-
tional law would eventually not seem such a stretch anymore, only a few years 
later.127 But, the problem is bigger still. As “law reform” and “assistance” crusades 
are on their way, growing day by day, the disconnection between law’s legality and 
its imagined legitimacy, invoked by those who can due to their status, influence and 
power, continues to widen. By consequence, chances for a true provincialization of 
the rhetoric informing those efforts remain slim and skepticism or, at the least, cau-
tion appears warranted. After all, invocations of rule-of-law promotions in either 
developed or developing countries are not, nor could they ever be, objective ac-
counts of existing conditions. Instead, all efforts of tracking, measuring, or account-
ing for the Rule of Law, historically, in comparison or along seemingly objective or 
merely technical yardsticks, are inevitably entangled in constructions of normative 
models of social order. Again, this is probably a very obvious observation, but one 
119.  Galactic Archive, “The Matrix” (1999) –’Construct’ Scenes, YOUTUBE (Feb. 6, 2009), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AGZiLMGdCE0 (demonstrating an impressive use of a void 
space, in which—as we can see through the course of the next minutes—anything is possible. As the 
authors discussed in this part of my paper illustrate, the space of ‘humanitarian intervention’ was created 
through similar uses of the imagination, with the employment of human rights language and the use of 
justifications based on an assumed and claimed responsibility to intervene). 
120.  Bulletproof, The Matrix: Neo Meets Trinity, YOUTUBE (Apr. 13, 2010), https://www 
.youtube.com/watch?v=jXeF1rMkpQw. 
121.  Sprish00, The Matrix–Follow the White Rabbit. . ., YOUTUBE (Apr. 1, 2009), https://www 
.youtube.com/watch?v=Smwrw4sNCxE. 
122.  See Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1
(1999); see also Antonio Cassese, Ex inuiria ius oritur: Are We Moving Towards International Legitimation of 
Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT’ L. 23 (1999). 
123.  Koskenniemi, supra note 106, at 160-61 (explaining that, “The ‘turn to ethics’ is profoundly 
conservative in its implications.” Id.).
124.  Orford, supra note 106. 
125.  See Andreas L. Paulus, The War Against Iraq and the Future of International Law: Hegemony or 
Pluralism?, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 691 (2004). 
126. Jack Goldsmith, What happened to the rule of law?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2013), http://www 
.nytimes.com/2013/08/31/opinion/what-happened-to-the-rule-of-law.html?_r=0. 
127.  Mégrét, supra note 30, at 3 (highlighting the ‘magnitude’ of the assumed ‘war’). 
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that merits being retained, particularly where assertions of the Rule of Law are em-
bedded in narratives of growth, modernization, development, or legal reform, where 
they are, in other words, at the root of theory and policy design—debatable, imple-
mentable, and measurable.128
At a time where public lawyers continue to mull over the implications of a 
transnational version of “government without governance,” an abundance of com-
prehensive “assistance” programmes has been under way, invoking just about every 
challenge of liberal rights theory–now poignantly re-emerging in a context of inter-
vention129, legal aid,130 transitional justice and development.131 But, does the unde-
niable existence of bias, power asymmetry and perverse effects rule out the validity 
of employing a formula such as the Rule of Law in order to create a discursive space 
where different background assumptions may be voiced? Is that not the gist of EP 
Thompson’s famous last chapter in Whigs and Hunters?132 And does this not illustrate 
the merits of a continued engagement with the Rule of Law as reference framework 
for competing understandings of legal, political and normative ordering, so that 
“. . .transnational Rule of Law discourse may be seen as Meta-TLO that frames and 
contextualizes all efforts to manage and regulate law, legitimacy, and conceptions of 
legality in the sphere of the transnational. . .”?133
Space 2: Global Constitutionalism: Looking for the Wizard 
Among the more recent proposals in the area of political-legal Global Gov-
ernance theory, Global Constitutionalism has been attracting considerable attention 
and increasing pedigree. Debates around, in favor of, and against global constitu-
tionalism regularly play out on two battlefields that echo, as it were, the already 
mentioned transnational replay of conceptual and doctrinal rhetoric and regulatory 
dilemmas between the nation state and the global sphere. For global constitutional-
ism, the battlefield is, on the one hand, the nation state, which serves as yardstick 
128.  For a critical discussion, see Jothie Rajah, ‘Rule of Law’ as Transnational Legal Order, in
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 340 (Terence Halliday et al. eds., 2015). 
129.  Compare Thomas Carothers, The Rule-of-Law Revival, in Promoting the Rule of Law 
Abroad 3 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006), with Rory Stewart & Gerald Knaus, CAN INTERVENTION 
WORK? 91 (2011); STEPHEN HUMPHREYS, THEATRE OF THE RULE OF LAW: TRANSNATIONAL 
LEGAL INTERVENTION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2010). 
130.  Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development: Second Generation Reforms and the Incorporation 
of the Social, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 199 (2004). 
131.  Rama Mani, Dilemmas of Expanding Transitional Justice, or Forging the Nexus between Transitional 
Justice and Development, in 2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 253 (2008). 
132.  E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 266 (1975) 
(stating, “I am not starry-eyed about this at all. This has not been a star-struck book. I am insisting only 
upon the obvious point, which some modern Marxists have overlooked, that there is a difference be-
tween arbitrary power and the rule of law. We ought to expose the shams and inequities which may be 
concealed beneath this law. But the rule of law itself, the imposing of effective inhibitions upon power 
and the defence of the citizen from power’s all-intrusive claims, seems to me to be an un-qualified good. 
To deny or belittle this good is, in this dangerous century when the resources and pretensions of power 
continue to enlarge, a desperate error of intellectual abstraction.”). 
133.  Rajah, supra note 127, at 343. 
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and ultimate arbiter for any conception, thick or thin, substantive or procedural, of 
globe-spanning constitutionalism.134 On the other hand, it is the global sphere itself, 
variably depicted as a space for which either we have no appropriate maps135 or one, 
which by its inchoate, violent nature would be immune to any attempt of constitu-
tionalization. In between and in counter-point to such assessments, we find sophis-
ticated interventions that argue for a critical understanding of a constitutionalism 
that has come undone from the Western nation-state’s edifice and must, instead, be 
searched for in the autopoetic, self-constitutive processes of functionally-differen-
tiated social organization.136 For the most part, however, these accounts still remain 
outside the mainstream discussion. Here, by contrast, it appears as if one could still 
hope to get away with line-drawing and by insisting that what should not be cannot 
be.137 And so, similarly to Dorothy leading the way for a host of improbable hero 
impersonators, we might have to understand the walk along the yellow brick road 
to find the wizard as a necessary process to come to terms with our conflicted emo-
tions of insecurity and hubris.138 There might be more to say, especially as global 
constitutionalism appears to have become a mostly internal debate amongst a small 
number of international law scholars and even fewer political philosophers. Mean-
while, the same fate might just be in store for global administrative law.139
Space 3: Who Needs the Rule of Law? The Global Market Space and its lex mercatoria 
The last rhetorical realm we look at is that of the infamous lex mercatoria, an 
allegedly autonomous legal order in its own right and, arguably, mostly bereft of 
politics. Lex mercatoria is the pure heaven (but on land and sea) of global commercial 
exchange, which is governed only by those rules that are accepted by those running 
the show.140 Even against the background of tenacious, even tedious historical ac-
counting of the degree of state agency in this entire circus,141 the relevant parties 
134.  Peters, supra note 27, at 398. 
135.  See Neil Walker, Taking Constitutionalism Beyond the State, 56 POL. STUD. 519 (2008); Neil 
Walker, Out of Place and Out of Time: Law’s Fading Coordinates, 14 EDINBURGH L. REV. 13 (2010). 
136.  Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centered Constitutional Theory?,
in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 3 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004); 
GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
GLOBALIZATION (Gareth Norbury trans., 2012); Christopher Thornhill, National Sovereignty and the Con-
stitution of Transnational Law: A Sociological Approach to a Classical Antinomy, 3 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL 
THEORY 394 (2012). 
137.  Nico Krisch, Global Administrative Law and the Constitutional Ambition, in THE TWILIGHT OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM? 245 (Petra Dobner et al. eds., 2010). 
138. Robert Magee Productions, We’re Off to See the Wizard, YOUTUBE (Oct. 1, 2013), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=26lhb05cV6g. 
139.  Sally Engle Merry, Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights, and Global Governance, in
LAW IN TRANSITION: RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (Peer Zumbansen et al. 
eds., 2014). 
140.  Berthold Goldman, Frontières du droit et ‘lex mercatoria’, 13 ARCHIVES DE LA PHILOSOPHIE 
DE DROIT 177 (1964); Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Merchants of Law as Moral Entrepreneurs: Constructing 
International Justice from the Competition for Transnational Business Disputes, 29 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 27 (1995). 
141.  Albrecht Cordes, The Search for a Medieval Lex Mercatoria, 5 OXFORD U. COMP. L. F., (2003) 
http://ouclf.iuscomp.org/articles/cordes.shtml. 
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could not seem to care less, whether it is in light of invocations of public law and 
accountability concerns142 or claims pertaining to private law’s inherent public pro-
tective and ultimately cosmopolitan dimensions.143 And even the global financial 
crisis appears not to have put a dent into what continues to be, after all, just a big 
gamble, in Cincinnati and elsewhere.144
Despite their apparent differences, there is something that cuts across our ex-
position of these spaces. Investigations into the confines, jurisdictions and demar-
cations of such spaces, for example, by those for or against humanitarian interven-
tion, or those enthusiastic or horrified over a war against terror, as well as those 
intrigued or bored by invocations of global constitutionalism and, lastly those who 
think they can domesticate global capitalism, are mostly driven by a concern with 
the controlling agency, in our case with the laws (conventions, standards, agree-
ments, and so forth) that govern a particular realm, a set of human interactions and 
institutional constellations. Our brief look at three such scenarios shows that the 
beauty continues to lie in the eyes of the beholder–and that is not just anyone. 
V. METHODOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES
But, where does this leave us in our attempt to develop a critique of transna-
tional legal ordering? Much of the prevailing anxiety seems to result from a certain 
starting presumption that somewhere and somehow it could all be organized differ-
ently. That is, of course, a very public law perspective. This observation, however, is 
not just of idiosyncratic relevance, but one with considerable critical potential. As 
we have seen much of what governs is an almost pathological belief in the state as 
guarantor of (both negative and positive) rights, a facilitator of democratic public 
discourse, a schizophrenic protector of free markets and social welfare. It is on the 
rhetorical battleground of the Rule of Law that the competing contentions of law’s 
role vis-à-vis society (encompassing individual rights bearers such as rich land own-
ers or weak bargaining parties, transnational corporations, religious associations as 
well as divorcees, prison inmates, welfare recipients, and the terminally ill with or 
142.  GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2006). See 
also the biting analysis offered by Claire Cutler, Human Rights Promotion through Transnational Investment 
Regimes: An International Political Economy Approach, 1 POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE 16 (2013) and Claire 
Cutler, Legal Pluralism as the ‘Common Sense’ of Transnational Capitalism, 3 ONATI SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES 
4, 719 (2013). 
143.  Robert Wai, The Cosmopolitanism of transnational economic law, in COSMOPOLITAN JUSTICE 
AND ITS DISCONTENTS 153 (Cecilia M. Bailliet et al. eds., 2011); Robert Wai, Private v Private, in PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 34 (Horatia Muir-Watt et al. eds., 2014). 
144.  Tyrolobo, “The Cincinnati Kid” (ending), YOUTUBE (Aug. 19, 2013), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UI6pSkIs_tc. Half seriously, but half seriously, at least, compare
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 80 (1923) (“But this long run is a mis-
leading guide to current affairs.”), with Leah Spiro, In Defense of the Fat Cats, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS’
ALPHA (May 1, 2012), http://www.institutionalinvestorsalpha.com/Article/3017777 
/Blogs-Unhedged-Commentary/In-Defense-of-the-Fat-Cats.html (quoting ROBERT J. SHILLER,
FINANCE AND THE GOOD SOCIETY (2012)) (“Ironically, better financial instruments, not less activity 
in finance, is what we need to reduce the probability of financial crises in the future.”). 
188 UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative Law [Vol. 1:161 
without a death wish) become entangled and the endless subject of negotiation. But, 
as long as the invocation of the concept of the Rule of Law retains even the slightest 
hint of a can-all, do-all institutional framework, there is in fact little hope that we 
may ever gain an even remotely adequate understanding of “laws and societies in 
global contexts.”145 As long as we conceive of the Rule of Law automatically (rather 
than ironically, historically self-consciously, and critically) as an institutionally 
evolved public law arrangement with particular institutional, procedural, and nor-
mative features, many of today’s transnational law challenges–from climate change, 
human trafficking, workers’ rights as human rights to corporate, commercial and 
contract governance standards–will remain outside the ambit of a routinized en-
gagement with law. We will not be able to look at those regulatory challenges 
through the lens of legality/legitimacy as long as the conception of the Rule of Law 
as institutionalized, authoritative institutional arrangement to generate, enforce and 
adjudicate law dominates our imagination.146
1. Embracing the Political Economy of Transnational Legal Ordering 
Let us now try to draw some practical lessons from the work thus far. One 
could be that we ought to reverse or switch the perspective away from imagining 
(the rule of) law as an institutionalized form with a particular historical trajectory 
and normative aspiration. Such a switch in perspective can be achieved by radically 
moving away from a public law conception of the Rule of Law. But, what happens 
if you take the Rule of Law out of the hands of public lawyers? You are bound to 
find a much more sober, even hands-on account of the plurality and diversity of 
worldwide existing order-by-rules (law, non-law, not-yet law) systems which each 
require a close, contextual scrutiny to be properly assessed.147 Such an approach 
might take you away from the apparent safeguard of a model of order and its (his-
torically evolved, fought over and consolidated) institutional architecture and its 
(eternally contested and tirelessly disputed) normative underpinnings. In fact, such 
a socio-legal and legal pluralist engagement with and in the world reveals several 
surprising insights. Above all, what becomes apparent is a (potentially rather) un-
settling continuity between accounts of fragmentation of legal orders promising cer-
tainty and predictability which are associated with globalization,148 on the one hand, 
and an in fact quite longstanding critical engagement with the relationship of law to 
145.  EVE DARIAN-SMITH, LAWS AND SOCIETIES IN GLOBAL CONTEXTS: CONTEMPORARY 
APPROACHES (2013). 
146.  See Fleur Johns, Performing Power: The Deal, Corporate Rule, and the Constitution of Global Legal 
Order, 34 J. L. & SOC’Y 116 (2007); FLEUR JOHNS, NON-LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. UNRULY 
LAW (2013). 
147.  Sally Falk Moore, Legal Systems of the World: An Introductory Guide to Classifications, 
Typological Interpretations, and Bibliographical Resources, in Law and the Social Sciences 11, 19ff, 
24ff, 29ff (Leon Lipson et al. eds., 1986) (arguing for a distinctly legal-sociological analysis not only of 
the pluralism of legal system among states, but within states themselves, as well as for a decentering of 
a Eurocentrist categorization of legal systems and their attributes) 
148.  Martti Koskenniemi & Paivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties,
15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 553 (2002). 
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society, on the other hand.149 What becomes apparent as well, when looking at the 
way in which stories of a large-scale, globalization-induced loss of coherence, unity, 
and universality of the Rule of Law are being told, are the parallels between such 
discursive framings and the interests at stake, both in the domestic and the interna-
tional context.150 In light of the previous observations it is of course trite to remind 
us of the fact that stories of both success or failure are always told from a particular 
perspective and against the background of a specific, even if only implicit, under-
standing of what mattered, and what was at stake and for whom.
All this suggests, at least, that there is something very wrong with just about 
any attempt to neatly separate the spheres of the Rule of Law before and after or 
under the conditions of globalization. There is no fresh starting point; there are only 
competing justifications of why we, or anyone, should care. Instead, we are thrown 
back onto ourselves and both our prejudices and ignorance. We are, in other words, 
forced to appreciate the very ways in which we conceive of law and its relation to 
social ordering–while realizing that we must urgently enter into a dialogue with 
those who have been at the colonial and post-colonial receiving end of the Rule of 
Law’s magic formula. Once we adopt a contextual and dialogical approach, narra-
tives of before and after likely give way to more adequate analyses of the different, 
intersecting forms of institutional and normative ordering which we can find in dif-
ferent places at different times. As Frank Upham emphasized in an essay on the 
Rule of Law in the context of law & development, “. . .law is deeply contextual and 
[. . .] cannot be detached from its social and political environment. This is just as 
true in developed countries as it in developing countries, but this truth is absent 
from the new rule-of-law orthodoxy.”151 Upham’s suggestion has significant conse-
quences for the way in which we treat existing accounts of what has worked and 
what has not. Because it turns out that, in a context of extensive human resources 
and massive funds still being poured into development projects worldwide, the way 
in which we draw connections between domestically focused investigations into 
changes to the Rule of Law and the transnational employment of the concept in 
hundreds of development projects worldwide becomes crucial. 
Context matters. As emphasized at various instances so far, the assertion of 
both the needs of a robust Rule of Law, stripped of all technicalities, as Hayek re-
marked, as well as of the challenges that might impede its achievement occurs—for 
the most part—in an abstract, ideological space. The Rule of Law is associated with 
processes and rights, with principles and values, and most often these can only be 
149.  See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8 (1927). 
150.  Martti Koskenniemi, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (2005); Kerry Rittich, Functionalism and Formalism: Their latest In-
carnations in Contemporary Development and Governance Debates, 55 U. TORONTO L. J. 853, 855 (2005) (ob-
serving how functionalist interpretations of state action has come to mean economic efficiency-enhanc-
ing). 
151.  Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule-of-Law Orthodoxy, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW 
ABROAD 75, 76 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006) (stating, “Law, in other words, is seen as technology 
when it should be seen as soci-ology or politics.”). 
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asserted in a heaven of pure legal concepts.152 What is wanting, at least within the 
core confines of lawyers’ day-in, day-out, teaching and research business, is the en-
gagement with the endlessly messy, inchoate and inconsistent operation of norms, 
institutions, governance patterns—after153 and before government154 on the 
ground. Despite lawyers’ quotidian interaction with the coincidental, accidental, and 
unpredictable, there still seems to be an unerring belief in the law somehow being 
above it all, supplying us with guidance, refuge and the promise that in the future 
all can be good. 
By consequence, regardless of whether we try to trace back the fragile regula-
tory arrangement post-Rana Plaza to existing (and, dwindling) trajectories of labour 
law,155 or make sense of corporate governance discourses before and after the 2008-
2009 financial crisis,156 it seems as if there is little value in carrying out such debates 
in abstract conceptual spaces alone. Instead, in both cases the real-world implica-
tions of the evolving regimes in labour and corporate law point to the importance 
of looking at the facts in play. Meanwhile, we see that such an interest in widening 
the conceptual range of one’s field is driven by concrete interests, and those are 
different in labour and corporate governance. At the height of the debate over the 
global convergence or divergence of corporate governance standards, the oppor-
tunity to apply a sound political economy analysis to the fast-changing landscape of 
corporations and the law that governed them was not taken up by many company 
lawyers, while the material, the research, and the analysis were all right there–prac-
tically in front of them. Political economists, economic sociologists, even geogra-
phers, anthropologists and comparative legal sociologists had been hard at work to 
illustrate the way in which corporations can be seen as “institutions that pervade the 
social and material fabric of everyday life [. . .]” and how they “shape human expe-
rience not only in spectacular and disastrous ways but also in mundane, every day, 
ambivalent, and positive ways,”157 thus providing ample substance to decentre and 
de-polemicise the convergence vs. divergence debate. Meanwhile, no one would 
deny the fact that corporate governance is an important part of transnational norm-
making and that we need to pay attention to the development of transnational ac-
tors, norms and processes in that regard. Meanwhile, however, there is little that 
suggests today that we could see any time soon a revival of interest in corporate 
152.  See the famous engagement with Ihering by Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the 
Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. R. 809 (1935). 
153.  Simon Roberts, After Government? On Representing Law Without the State, 68 MODERN L. R.
1 (2005). 
154.  See Fernanda Pirie, Law before Government: Ideology and Aspiration, 30 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 207 (2010). 
155.  See Harry W. Arthurs, Reinventing Labor Law for the Global Economy: The Benjamin Aaron Lec-
ture, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 271 (2001). 
156.  Simon Deakin, Corporate Governance and Financial Crisis in the Long Run, in THE EMBEDDED 
FIRM: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, LABOUR AND FINANCIAL CAPITALISM (Peer Zumbansen et al. 
eds., 2011). 
157.  Marina Welker et al., Corporate Lives: New Perspectives on the Social Life of the Corporate Form,
52 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY S3, S3–S4 (2011). 
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governance theory that would be comparable to that of the late 1990s and early 
2000s,158 a debate that petered onwards for a while with a focus on issues such as 
executive compensation, “say on pay” as well as director versus shareholder pri-
macy. So, in terms of being a popular field of critical, socio-legal analysis; it does 
not appear as if corporate governance today is “where the action is,” if by action we 
mean hard-hitting analysis and critique of regulatory development in a crucial gov-
ernance area with transnational impact. But, that is where the Rule of Law must be 
searched for today–just like we have to build labour law in and from cases such as 
Rana Plaza. 
2. Territories and Spaces of the Transnational Rule(s) of Law 
In light of these findings, what makes up the Rule of Law in a global context? 
How are we to imagine a transnational Rule of Law? The space in which this trans-
national variation of Rule of Law analysis occurs is multilayered; it is a construct to 
the degree that its architects evoke a governable, confined realm of human agency, 
institutional dynamics, and rule obedience.159 But, it is also a discursive space of 
contention over values and, in the background of such disputes, over the power 
structures that inform, sustain, and control this space. Political scientists160 and ge-
ographers161 alike criticize the non-death of the neoliberal mantra that—seemingly 
unbroken since the “roaring Nineties”—continues to hold strong persuasive stance 
while legal sociologists ponder over the strange mix of institutional ambiguity and 
concrete impact of transnational power.162 Lawyers have a lot of catching up to do 
in their effort to adequately penetrate and theorize these evolving transnational reg-
ulatory structures. Clearly, an important step would be to critically reflect on the 
role that one’s own placement in either a private or public law universe is playing in 
the way we categorize and interpret transnational governance forms. With both in-
ternational and domestic public lawyers-turned-global engaged in tireless and detail-
rich analyses of iterations of public authority, on the one hand,163 and emerging 
158.  See, e.g., the excellent collection, COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE. THE STATE 
OF THE ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998), and the comprehensive, 
critical analysis by John W. Cioffi, State of the Art: A Review Essay on Comparative Corporate Governance: The 
State of the Art and Emerging Research, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 501 (2000). 
159.  Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel, 17 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 15 (2006). 
160.  See COLIN CROUCH, THE STRANGE NON-DEATH OF NEO-LIBERALISM (2011). 
161. DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2005). 
162.  Dan Danielsen, Local Rules and a Global Economy: An Economic Policy Perspective, 1 
TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 49 (2010); Roger Cotterrell, Spectres of Transnationalism: Changing Terrains 
of Sociology of Law, 36 J. L. & SOC’Y 481 (2009); Roger Cotterrell, What is Transnational Law?, 37 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 500 (2012); Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Private Regulatory Governance: Ambiguities of Public 
Authority and Private Power, 76 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117 (2013). 
163.  Armin Von Bogdandy et al., Developing the Publicness of Public International Law, 9 GERMAN 
L. J. 1375 (2008); ARMIN VON BOGDANDY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL LAWMAKING ON 
PUBLIC AUTHORITY AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Armin Von 
Bogdandy et al. eds., 2012). 
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forms of global administrative law structures, on the other,164 private lawyers need 
to move beyond Hayek, but also Fuller,165 in order to start asking (again166) the hard 
questions as to who does what how and in whose interests. Maybe the regulatory after-
math of the global financial crisis and its continuing permutations can, for a little 
longer, still offer one of the much needed opportunities for a comprehensive polit-
ical economy analysis of transnational financial law that takes the available historical 
factual accounts by finance experts167 and banking and securities law scholars168 as 
well as regulatory governance theorists169 seriously. Yet, this space is not one for the 
specialists or planners against whom Hayek displayed such abhorrence. It is not a 
space that ought to be left to experts.170 If it is true that transnational regulatory 
spaces are construction sites of an emerging, however fragmented legal order, then 
we are in need of a more sophisticated methodological approach. By showing con-
tinuities between legal realist, anti-formalist, and other alternative law critiques in 
the domestic context, on the one hand, and fragmentation anxieties in the global 
arena, on the other, we managed to emphasize the need to recognize law as always 
precarious, as always in danger of being hijacked, instrumentalized, silenced, or per-
verted. If transnational regulatory spaces bear the mark of the absence of well-
known (and often romanticized) institutional safeguards, then it appears obvious 
that neither a turning away from the transnational law project nor its appropriation 
through domestic transplants are an option. Instead, what is needed are means of 
relating the domestic and the global by conceiving of transnational law not as a 
distinct legal field, but as a reflective framework to consider different, co-existing 
and intersecting models of normative ordering. 
164.  Benedict Kingsbury, et al., Global Governance as Administration—National And Transnational 
Approaches to Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2005); Sabino Cassese, New Paths 
for Administrative Law: A Manifesto, 10 INT’L J. CONS. L. 603 (2012). 
165.  But see Thomas Schultz, The Concept of Law in Transnational Arbitral Legal Orders and Some of 
its Consequences, 2 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 59, 71 (2011) (highlighting Fuller’s contribution to a pro-
cedural theory of justice). 
166.  Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q.
470 (1923); David Campbell, The End of Posnerian Law and Economics, 73 MOD. L. REV. 305 (2010). 
167.  See GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW UNRESTRAINED GREED CORRUPTED A 
DREAM, SHATTERED GLOBAL MARKETS AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE (2009); NOURIEL 
ROUBINI & STEPHEN MIHM, CRISIS ECONOMICS: A CRASH COURSE IN THE FUTURE OF FINANCE
(2010). 
168.  Steven Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L. J. 193 (2008); Cristie Ford, Principles-Based Se-
curities Regulation in the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis, 55 MCGILL L. J. 257 (2010). 
169.  Julia Black, Seeing, Knowing, Regulating Financial Markets: Moving the Cognitive Framework from 
the Economic to the Social (LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Paper No. 24, 2013), http://ssrn 
.com/abstract=2346098. 
170.  See David Kennedy, Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance, 27 SYD. L. REV.
5, 6 (2005) (“Indeed, to say the world is covered in law is also to say we are increasingly governed by 
experts.”).
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As argued elsewhere,171 the triad of A(ctors), N(orms) and P(rocesses) might 
offer possible translation and interaction categories to bridge different governance expe-
riences and practices in a transnational context. The triad attempts not only to draw 
on, but to critically engage and provincialize, the insights, including the dominant 
and contesting narratives, regarding success, progress, as well as parochialism from 
Western Rule of Law traditions in the light of a much wider recognition of author-
ity-bearing norms. Complementing this dimension is a complication of transna-
tional regulatory spaces through law’s confrontation with other disciplines’ efforts 
of world-making. Building on long-standing advances in socio-legal studies, includ-
ing the most welcome revival of a transnationally minded economic sociology of 
law172 as well as drawing inspiration from historical and social theory research into 
transnational histories, lawyers are called upon to conceive of transnational regula-
tory spaces not as sites of emergency and ad-hoc regulation or crisis management, 
but as sites of interdisciplinary engagement and reflection. Through such an engage-
ment, lawyers are likely to uncover the various political blind-spots and parochial 
associations of legal world construction as offered under the headings, for example, 
of global constitutionalism or global administrative law. Inevitably, such an ap-
proach will shake up vocabularies, terminology and conceptual frameworks173; and, 
at the same time, such engagement very likely cannot remain descriptive or analyti-
cal, but will have to get its hands dirty in one way or the other. 
What, then, is Transnational Law in relation to the ongoing search for a new, 
global Rule of Law, a global administrative law, global constitutionalism or calls for 
transnational legal order? Transnational Law is, we might say now, to a large degree 
an encounter of the familiar, but forgotten, or often not explicit, in unfamiliar, seem-
ingly new contexts. In those contexts, we revisit the omissions, the blind spots, the 
exclusions and silenced voices, the failed protests and the aborted reforms. Half 
seriously, but that at least, legal positivism for our time must learn from and engage 
with a historically and geographically conscious pluralism—to be rightfully called 
legal positivism. For the time being, though, it seems that there is neither transna-
tional law as law, nor legal positivism as transnational legal positivism. Instead, what 
we have is a candle burning on both ends. By critically reflecting on our way of 
applying “what we know” (from domestic law, from our cases and our jurispru-
dence) to a “different,” “global” context, it becomes apparent that we are also call-
ing into question the basis on which the application occurs. In that process, we likely 
grow insecure not only as to the solid foundations we are purportedly standing on, 
171.  Peer Zumbansen, Lochner Disembedded: The Anxieties of Law in a Global Context, 20 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 29 (2013); Peer Zumbansen, What Lies Before, Behind and Beneath a Case? Five 
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the norms, institutions, processes and actors, but also the laws, principles and values 
we think we can rely on as the DNA of our legal system. And, then, to the degree 
that we let skepticism about the existing legal order’s firmness sneak in, are we pull-
ing away the ladder on which we stand?
3. Dinner Won’t Be Ready 
For the time being, then, we find ourselves in the grip of a growing fear of 
falling into an abyss of neo-liberal nightmares of market-made norms, voluntary and 
consumer-monitored compliance mechanisms, of soft law and codes, of strangely 
intransparent but increasingly ubiquitous and influential expert committees and of 
just too much state-bashing in the name of an emerging autonomous legal order for 
world society. But, where to stop? Is going “back” to the domestic world of the 
(established, practiced and egalitarian) Rule of Law a serious option? 
Would we really find it, waiting there for us—like Max finds his dinner when 
returning from where the Wild Things were? 
